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LAW NOTES
CORPORATE NAME; REGISTERED OFFICE AND
AGENT; SERVICE OF PROCESS
CHAPTER 1.3
SCOPE
This note will be concerned with those sections of the South
Carolina Business Corporations Act of 19621 which deal with
the corporate name, registered office and registered agent,
and evidentiary considerations pertaining to corporate docu-
ments and records.
The treatment of the corporate name section is limited by
space considerations. Any treatment of corporate names
must, of necessity, take into consideration the common law
of trade-mark, trade-name, and unfair competition. Those
fields are covered here only to the extent that they affect the
selection and use of names between corporations. No attempt
has been made to treat trade-marks, trade-names, and unfair
competition as to the rights of individuals under the common
law, or as to the effect Federal codification of such laws may
have on the corporation in its relation with individuals or
other corporations.
Many of the points discussed in this note are correlative
to those discussed in articles and notes elsewhere in this issue;
from time to time reference will be made to those appropriate
to points discussed here.
CORPORATE NAME
Selection of a name for an embryo corporation is an im-
portant decision of the organizers. That a corporation must
have a name is a truism2 recognized since the days of Black-
stone.3 Careful selection of the corporate name, from a legal
1. Hereafter, the act will be referred to as "the 1962 Act." Unless
otherwise specified reference to such phrases as "the old law" the "exist-
in glaw," etc., will mean Title Twelve of the S. C. CODE (Supp. 1962).
2. American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372, 70 L. Ed.
317 (1926); Cincinnati Cooperage Co. v. Bate, 96 Ky. 356, 26 S. W. 538
(1894); First Nat'l Bank of Ceredo v. Huntington Distilling Co., 41 W.
Va. 530,23 S. E. 792 (1895).
3. "When a corporation is erected; a name must be given to it; and
by that name it must sue and be sued, and do all legal acts . . . Such
name is the very being of its constitution; . . ." 1 Bl. Comm. 474.
492
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standpoint, can do much to preclude future litigation. A
carefully selected name will not infringe upon the rights of
others to use a similar name and will be such that if it is
infringed upon by others, the courts can furnish protection.
There is a basic common law right which allows a corpora-
tion to be protected in its corporate name4 and equity will
protect it against use of the same or a similar name.0 Such
a provision is embodied in the 1962 Act 6 and will be discussed
in detail later. . i
The 1962 Act requires that the name of every corporation
shall contain one of the following words or an abbreviation
thereof: "Corporation," "incorporated," or "limited.' 7 This
should eliminate the confusing distinctions which have arisen
as to the meanings of such words as "company," "& Co.,"
"Co., Inc.," etc.s Existing domestic and foreign corporations,
other than banks, insurance companies and railroads, the
names of which do not include such words or abbreviations
will be required to make an appropriate amendment and notify
the Secretary of State. The board of directors of a domestic
corporation may make such a change without shareholder
approval.9 Under the new act, those words required to be
used as indicative of corporate status are absolutely pro-
hibited to unincorporated business enterprises. 10 There is
no statutory or common law in South Carolina which requires
that the corporate name be in English; indeed, both the case
law" and statutes 2 of other jurisdictions allow non-English
names.
The new act prohibits the use of words (in the name) which
imply that a corporation is engaged in a business different
4. Investor Publishing Co. v. Dobinson, 72 Fed. 603 (C. C. S. D. Cal.
1896); Industrial Mut. Deposit Co. v. Central Mut. Deposit Co., 112 Ky.
937,66 S. W. 1032 (1902).
5. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Rutledge, 128 F. Supp. 1 (D. Alaska
1955); Dorothy Gray Salons v. Miles Sales Co. of N. Y., 162 Misc. 789,
295 N. Y. Supp. 204 (1937).
6. S. C. CODE §12-13.1(a) (3) (Supp. 1962).
7. S. C. CoDE §12-13.1(1) (Supp. 1962).
8. Core Joint Concrete Pipe Corp. v. Piano Bros., Inc., 285 N. Y.
Supp. 706 (App. Div. 1936).
9. S. C. CODE §12-13.1 (d) (1) (Supp. 1962).
10. S. C. CODE §12-13.1(e) (Supp. 1962).
11. In re Deutsch - Amerikanischer Volksfest-Verien, 200 Pa. 143
49 Atl. 949 (1901).
12. Delaware, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Washington, and Puerto Rico provide that any language
may be used as long as the words are in either English or Roman char-
acters. MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. §7[2.02 (1960).
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from that authorized by its charter.13 Similar statutory pro-
visions have been enacted in seventeen other jurisdictions. 4
There has been much confusion regarding the interpreta-
tion of statutes relating to the protection of corporate names. 15
There are two common law theories upon which recovery
may be had. One is that of trade-mark or trade-name and the
other is that of unfair competition.' 6 A distinction is some-
times made between trade-marks and trade-names. Basically,
a trade-mark pertains to a tangible thing sold, and a trade-
name pertains to the individual indentification of a business.'
7
'Generally, the distinction is not important since the same
-principles will apply to protection under either term.'8 The
purpose of the protection afforded is sometimes mentioned:
the protection given a trade-mark is for the benefit of the
,public and that given to a trade-name is for the benefit of
the party entitled to use of the name.19 In any case, protec-
tion under the law of trade-mark seems to be substantially
similar to protection under the law of trade-name.
The recurring problem in interpreting statutes similar to
that in South Carolina has been the determination of the
ground for recovery: trade-mark, unfair competition, or strict
statutory application have all been proposed. This is mainly
important in ascertaining the breadth of protection afforded.
An early South Carolina case, Telephone Mfg. Co. of Sumter
v. Sumter Tel. Mfg. Co. 20 used the narrow ground of trade-
mark; the court said:
"The same principles apply in cases of similarity of cor-
porate names and those of the similarity of trade-marks,
13. S.C. CODE §12-13.1 (a) (2) (Supp. 1962).
14. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. §7f2.02 (1960).
15. See generally, annotations: 65 A. L. R. 2d 263 (1959); 421 A. L.
R. 2d 1156 (1955); 42 A. L. R. 2d 516 (1955); 174 A. L. R. 496 (1940);
150 A. L. R. 1067 (1944);. 115 A. L. R. 1241 (1938); 66.A. L. R. 934
(1930); 63 A. L. R. 1046 (1929); 56 A. L. R. 447 (1928); 48 A. L. R.
1257 (1927); 27 A. L. R. 954 (1923);, 17 A. L. R. 770 (1922).
16. Terminal Barber Shops, Inc. v. Zoberg, 28 F. 2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928);
Alhambra Transfer Storage Co. v. Muse, 41 Cal. App. 2d 92, 106 P. .2d
63 (Ct. of App. 1940); 6 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §2423 (1950).
17. American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, supra note 2; Acme Chem.
Co. v. Dobkin, 68 F. Supp. 601 (W. D. Pa. 1946).
18. Holmes, Booth & Hayden v. Holmes, Booth & Atwood Mfg. Co., 37
Conn. 278, 9 Am. Rep. 324 (1870); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. of Kan., 21 Abb. N. Cas. 104, 1 N. Y. Supp.
44 (S. Ct. 1888); Blackwell's Durham Tobacco Co..v. American Tobacco
Co., 145 N. C. 367, 59 S. E. 123 (1907); 6 FLETCHE, PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS §2423 (1950).
19. Armington v. Palmer, 21 R. I. 109, 42 Atl. 308 (1898).
20. 63 S. C. 313, 41 S. E. 322 (1902). .
[Vol. I&
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each being entitled to protection under identically the
same rules and principles. The name of a corporation
from necessity is its trade-mark."
In that case, injunctive relief was denied since the similar
names, being geographic and generic in nature, were not
available for exclusive appropriation.2 ' It should be noted
that the trade-mark rule as to geographic and generic name
is not without exceptions. A name clearly geographic or
generic in nature (i. e., Southern Railroad, General Electric,
Standard Oil) may acquire, after long use, a secondary mean-
ing. Such names will have been so associated with one busi-
ness as to be generally understood to mean that business.
22
Because of the narrowness of the trade-mark ground of
protection, some other means was desirable. Courts have
sought to grant injunctive relief on the basis of unfair com-
petition. Where relief is afforded under the law of unfair
competition, there are two interests to be protected: the in-
terest of the using public, which might be deceived by similar
names and the interests of the corporation in its exclusive
use of a name under which it has acquired good will and
custom. 23 A later South Carolina case, Planters' Fertilizer
& Phosphate Co. v. Planters' Fertilizer Co.,24 decided after
the enactment of a statute prohibiting a name the same as
that of any existing corporation, used unfair competition as
the basis of its decision to affirm allowance of injunctive re-
lief. The court carefully distinguished the Telephone Corn-
pany case in that it relied on trade-mark as the basis of pro-
tection and the Planters' case relied on the confusion of goods
put upon the market by the respective parties. It should be
noted that the plaintiff in the Planters' case was known to
its customers as "Planters' Fertilizer Co." As to the degree
of confusion necessary for relief the court said:
21. See also, Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 109 F.
2d 35 (D. C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied 309 U. S. 684, 84 L. Ed. 1028 (1940) ;
Rochester Say. Bank v. Rochester Say. & Loan Ass'n., 170 Misc. 983,
11 N. Y. S. 2d 130 (S. Ct. 1939).
22. Brooks Bros. v. Brooks Clothing of Cal., Inc., 60 F. Supp. 442
(S. D. Cal. 1945), aff'd 158 F. 2d'798 (9th Cir. 1946) - American Prods. Co.
v. American Prods. Co., 42 F. 2d 488 (E. D. Mich. 1930): Standard Oil Co.
of N. Y. v. Standard Oil Co. of Me., 38 F. 2d. 677 (S. D. Me. 1930).
23. Holmes, Booth & Hayden v. Holmes, Booth & Atwood. Mfg. Co.
supra note 18; Atlanta Paper Co. v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 184 Ga. 205,
190 S. E. 777 (1938); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Farmers Loan &
Trust Co. of Kan., supra note 18; Federal See. Co. v. Federal Sec. Corp.,
129 Ore. 375, 276 Pac. 1100 (1929).
24. 135 S. C. 282, 133 S. E. 706 (1926).
19631
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"What degree of resemblance is sufficient to warrant
the interference of a court in cases of this kind is not
capable of exact definition. It is, and must be, from the
very nature of the case, mainly a question of fact to be
determined by the circumstances appearing in each par-
ticular case. In general, it may be said that, if the re-
semblance is such as to mislead purchasers or those doing
business with the person or corporation using the name,
who are acting with ordinary caution, this is suffi-
cient."-"
The injunctive relief allowed in this case seems to have been
based not upon the statute, but rather on the common law of
unfair competition.
The broadest ground for recovery is that of strict statutory
interpretation. The new South Carolina act is very specific:
names shall not be deceptively similar to appropriated
names. 20 A qualification is that nothing in the section shall
abrogate or limit the law as to unfair competition or the
right to acquire and protect trade-marks and trade-names.
27
It remains questionable, then, whether the statute does any-
thing more than briefly codify the law, as to corporate names,
of trade-mark and unfair competition. A number of cases in
other jurisdictions have been decided on just such a basis.
In Burnside Veneer Corp. v. New Burnside Veneer Co. 28 under
a statute essentially the same as that in South Carolina,
29
the court denied relief on the common law ground of trade-
mark: generic and geographic names could not be appropri-
ated because of the "absurd" results, not within the con-
templation of the legislature, which would be reached. The
North Carolina court has held, as under the common law,
that actual use is necessary before protection will be afforded
a prior appropriator.30 Delaware, though, has held that its
statute removes the necessity of showing user ;31 the Washing-
ton court, in Diamond Drill Contracting Co. v. International
25. Id. at 291, 133 S. E. at 708, quoting with approval from Atlas
Assur. Co. v. Atlas Ins. Co., 138 Iowa 228, 112 N. W. 232 (1907).
26. S. C. CODE §12-13.1(a) (3) (Supp. 1962).
27. S. C. CODE §12-13.1(g) (Supp. 1962).
28. 247 S. W. 2d 524 (Ky. 1952).
29. KY. REv. STAT. §271.045(2) (1953).
30. Blackwell's Durham Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., supra
note 18; accord, Lawyers' Title Ins. Co. v. Lawyers' Title Ins. Corp.,
supra note 21; Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201
Fed. 510 (7th Cir. 1912).
31. Drugs Consol., Inc. v. Drugs Incorporated, 144 Atl. 656 (Del. Ch.
1929).
[Vol. 15
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Diamond Drill Contracting Co. 32 makes deception of the public
the essential criterion in refusing to approve injunctive relief
in applying a statute similar to that in South Carolina. The
names there were in the main identical, but since both cor-
porations catered to a specialized clientele which was not
likely to be confused, the court found that the statute offered
no protection. The court was able to reach a result, under
the statute, which might have been as easily reached under
the common law of trade-mark; the rationale of the decision
is significant.
In Cleveland Opera Co. v. Cleveland Civic Opera Assn.33 the
court went one step further and approved relief based on the
words of the statute prohibiting names so similar as to cause
confusion and unfair competition.
3 4
Another case which was decided more on a basis of statute
than common law is Drugs Consol. Inc. v. Drugs Incorpo-
Tated.35 There, the court held descriptive words might be used
if there were some distinguishing factor to avoid the con-
fusion contemplated in the statute.s6
One word, "deceptively," is the key to a reasonable and
proper interpretation of the new South Carolina act If
relief is granted or denied on a broad interpretation of what
constitutes "deceptive similarity," the fairest results will be
reached. The common law of trade-marks and unfair com-
petition can then be relegated to their proper position as
factors to be considered, rather than law to be applied. By
such a broad interpretation the courts can avoid or utilize,
as the facts demand, the rules as to generic and geographic
-names, secondary meaning, user, injury to the public, and
injury to the prior appropriator of a name. All these factors
should be considered, but only to the extent of making a de-
termination as to whether there is deception or confusion.
After all, these words, "deception and confusion" are the
essence of the law of trade-mark, trade-name, and unfair
competition. This is the concept of the Diamond Drill, Cleve-
land Opera Co., and Drugs Cons., Inc. cases discussed above;
such a view seems to allow equitable results on sound judicial
principles.
32. 106 Wash. 72, 179 Pac. 120 (1919).
33. 22 Ohio App. 400, 154 N. E. 352 (1926).
34. Id. at 402, 154 N. E. at 354.
35. Supra note 31.
36. Id. 144 AtI. at 658.
1963]
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The 1962 Act provides that a corporation may use a name,
notwithstanding the "deceptively similar" prohibition, if writ-
ten permission of the prior appropriator is filed with the
Secretary of State. 7 The efficacy of this provision is ques-
tionable when two other provisions of the act are considered:
first, the Secretary of State may refuse to file the articles of
incorporation if he finds, inter alia, that the provisions of
the "deceptively similar" prohibitions have not been complied
with ;ss second, nothing in the section shall abrogate or limit
the law of unfair competition or unfair trade practice.8 9 The
leading case in South Carolina 40 bases its decision on the
common law of unfair competition rather than the application
of a statute similar to the provision of the present act. When
it is considered that the rationale of the law of unfair com-
petition is protection of the public as well as the corporation,
4'
then there seems to be good reason to believe that the Secre-
tary of State would be justified in refusing to file the articles
of incorporation even if the required written permission had
been duly filed.
. A corporation may not use any name which implies that it
transacts any business for which governmental authorization
is required unles a statement of such authorization has been
granted and certified in writing by the appropriate officer
of commission. 42 Such statutes are usually based on the police
power and have been held constitutional by the courts.48
Similar legislation in other jurisdictions has presented prob-
lems relative to corporations with previously selected pro-
hibited names.44 This provision should present little or no
trouble in South Carolina as to pre-existing corporations;
the 1962 Act also provides that nothing in the corporate
name section shall require any existing domestic corporation
"to add to, modify or otherwise -change its "corporate
name.. ." Deception of the public seems to be the principal
87. S. C. CoDE §12-13.1(a) (3) (Supp. 1962).
'88. S. C. CODE §12-13.1(b) (Supp. 1962).
39. S. C. CODE §12-13.1(g) (Supp. 1962).
40. Planters' Fertilizer & Phosphate Co. v. Planters' Fertilizer Co.,
supra note 24.
41. Holmes, Booth & Hayden v. Holmes, Booth & Atwood Mfg. Co.,
upra note 18; Federal Sec. Co. v. Federal Sec. Corp., supra note 23.
42. S. C. CODE §12-13.1(a) (4) (b) (Supp. 1962).
48. Inglis v. Pontius. 102 Ohio St. 140, 131 N. E. 509 (1921); Union
Trust Co. v. Moore, 104 Wash. 50, 175 Pac. 565 (1918).
44. McKee v. American Trust Co., 166 Ark. 480, 266 S. W. 293 (1924);
Lornsten v. Union Fisherman's Co-op Packing Co., 71 Ore. 540, 1403 Pac.
621 (1914).
45. S. C. CODE §12-13.1(d) (Supp. 1962).
[Vol. 15
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reason for inclusion of this provision. An.implication that a
corporation is engaged in banking, insurance, or transporta-
tion is an obvious violation; illustrative of the less obvious
type violation contemplated is In re New York State Voter
League, Inc.4 6 where the court held that such a name might
be thought to be an official arm or function of the State.
Fraternal, veterans', service, religious, and similar organi-
zations are protected from any implication by another cor-
poration that it is affiliated with them unless such is true.
47
Whether the provisions of the act are violated by a partic-
ular name is a discretionary decision to be made by the Sec-
retary of State. If he finds the name of a proposed corpora-
tion violates the provisions of the statute, he shall refuse
to file the incorporation papers. Decisions of the Secretary
of State are, of course, reviewable by the courts.
48
Violations of the corporate name section which are dis-
covered subsequent to incorporation or authorization in no
way impair or invalidate the violator's existence or authority
to do business. The appropriate remedy for the injured party
would be in the courts - either by injunction or other ap-
propriate relief.
49
There are many improper uses of corporate names which
are not specifically treated by the act. Such improper uses
are dealt with by providing that nothing in the act shall
abrogate the law of unfair competition or unfair trade prac-
tice. In like manner, it is provided that there is no deroga-
tion of the law of trade-mark or trade-name.5 0 The Reporter's
Notes to the act state:
"Without this provision (the section prohibiting 'decep-
tively similar' names) might be deemed exclusive of any
common law or other statutory remedies." 51
RESERVED NAME
The Reserved Name section of the act allows a yet-to-be
formed domestic or foreign corporation or- a not-yet-author-
46. 157 N. Y. S. 2d 210 (S. Ct. 1956).
47. S. C. CODE §12-13.1 (a) (4) (b) (Supp. 1962).
48. For a discussion of remedies available by administrative processes
and through the courts, see generally, Tighe, 'Duties of the Secretary of
State, elsewhere in this issue.
49. S. C. CODE §12.1(c) (Supp. 1962).
50. S .C. CODE §12-13.1(g) (Supp. 1962).
51. DRAFT VERsIoN, S. C. Bus. CORP. AcT OF 1962, REPoR m's NOTES,
p. 19.
-1963] 499
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ized foreign corporation to appropriate a name in advance
of its incorporation or authorization to do business. In like
manner, domestic and foreign corporations contemplating
a change of name may appropriate a new name by reserva-
tion.5 2
The major objective of the section is to combat a type of
blackmail in which the name of a proposed domestic corpora-
tion or not-yet-authorized foreign corporation is used as the
name of a sham corporation, thus requiring those having a
legitimate need for the name to buy off the unscrupulous
opportunists. 53 While such practices have not been a problem
in South Carolina in the past, the expansion of industry in
the State and the growing market-potential of the State makes
such a provision highly appropriate.
Reservation is accomplished by filing an application with
the Secretary of State.54 It should be noted that any name
reserved must comply with the provisions of the corporate
name section of the act.55 A reservation is effective for a
period not exceeding one hundred twenty days56 and may
be transferred to any other person or corporation by filing
in the office of the Secretary of State a notice of such
transfer.57
Since the main purpose of the act is to avoid improper or
bad faith dealings in corporate names, it is within the dis-
cretion of the Secretary of State to revoke any reservation
if he finds such reservation or transfer of reservation was
not made in good faith. 8
REGISTERED NAME
When South Carolina included the registered name 9 sec-
tion in its new corporation act it joined the ranks of an en-
lightened minority of jurisdictions.60 Basically, the section
provides a means by which an existing foreign corporation
may reserve the availablility of its name for a period longer
52. S. C. CODE §12-13.2 (Supp. 1962).
53. DnAFT VERSION, S. C. Bus. CORP. ACT oF 1962, REPoRTER's NOTEs,
p. 20.
54. S. C. CODE §12-13.2(b) (Supp. 1962).
55. S. C. CODE §12-13.2(a) (Supp. 1962).
56. S. C. CODE §12-13.2(b) (Supp. 1962).
57. S. C. CODE §12-13.2(c) (Supp. 1962).
58. S. C. CODE §12-13.2(d) (Supp. 1962).
59. S. C. CODE §12-13.3 (Supp. 1962).
60. As of March, 1962, nine other jurisdictions had enacted comparable
statutory provisions. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. §§9,10 (1960).
[Vol. I's
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than that permitted in the "reserved name" section of the act.
Corporations contemplating future activities in South Caro-
lina will find this provision particularly convenient. Since
this section serves, to some extent, the same purpose as the
"reserved name" section, it will avoid the "business black-
nail" referred to in the discussion of that section. In addi-
tion, it provides a means by which an out-of-state business
enterprise can preclude appropriation of its name under the
common law of trade-mark and trade-name. The common
law of trade-name and trade-mark is regional in doctrine and
mere appropriation in one trading area does not preclude
a later appropriation of the same name in another trading
area.6'
A corporation organized and existing under the laws of
any other state or territory may register its corporate name
as long as that name is not the same as or deceptively similar
to that of any domestic corporation, authorized foreign cor-
:poration, or any name reserved or registered under the act.
The same standard should be applied in determining what con-
stitutes deceptively similar as that applied in the "corporate
name" section of the act. Once registration is accomplished
it is valid until the end of the calendar year and is renewable
from year to year for up to ten years.62
REGISTERED OFFICE AND REGISTERED AGENT
The use of the words "registered office" and "registered
agent" marks a conceptual change in this phase of corpora-
tion law in South Carolina. Prior to the 1962 Act, corpora-
tions were required, by legislative interpretation of a man-
-date of the South Carolina Constitution, to maintain an agent
'for service of process at its principal place of business.68
61. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 60 L. Ed.
7V13 (1916).
62. S. C. CODE §12-13.3(d) (Supp. 1962).
63. Corporations, other than mercantile corporations, are required by
-the state constitution to maintain an agent for service of process and a
'public office for the transaction of business; the legislature is empowered
'to provide for binding service of process on agents of corporations. S. C.
-CoNST. art. 9, §4. Under the old statute, the charter of the corporation
was required to state the location of the principal place of business of the
corporation. S. C. CODE §12-58 (1952). Thus, the concept of the old
statute was that the public office required by the state constitution was
'to be the principal place of business of the corporation. The meaning of
"the term "mercantile corporation" is not clear, but this should not cause
•any trouble since there is nothing in the state constitution which is pro-
'hibitive of a legislative requirement that "mercantile" corporations main-
tain an office. DRAFT VEnsioN, S. C. Bus. CORP. AcT OF 1962, REPORTE'S
NOTEs, p. 22.
1963]
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The 19&2 Act requires only that there be an office and an.
agent and. that pertinent information concerning them be
filed with the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State
shall maintain this information on file so as to provide ready
reference to the name and location of any corporation's agent.
It is specifically provided that the registered agent may be
an individual, a domestic corporation, or an authorized for-
eign corporation. In any case, the business office of the
registered agent must be the same as the registered office-
of the corporation.
64
These changes from the "principal place of business" con-
cept should be especially useful to the domestic corporatiom.
which wishes to carry on the management of its business-
elsewhere than in South Carolina. Such a corporation may-
thus employ as its agent an attorney or one of those corpora-
tions which make it part of their business to act as statutory-
agents for other corporations.
CHANGE OF REGISTERED OFFICE AND REGISTERED'
AGENT
The provisions of the 1962 Act concerning the registered'
office and registered agent are almost identical to those of'
the Model Business Corporations Act. 65 The concept of the
Model Act is that change of the registered office and agent
of a corporation is a routine matter within the ambit of the!
board of directors.66 In view of this, following authorization
of its board of directors, a corporation may change its regis-.
tered agent or office by simply filing specified declarations:
with the Secretary of State.6
7
This is a marked departure from the previous statutory-
provisions; under the old statute, the location of the corpora--
tion's principal place of business was one of the charter
declarations.68 For absolute safety, a corporation would have
to have amended its charter when the location of its principr
place of business changed since charter amendments require
shareholder approval. 9 Thus, the utility of the concept of
the 1962 Act is obvious.
64. S. C. CODE §12-13.4 (Supp. 1962).
65. MODEL BUS- CORP. ACT ANN. .§11,12 (1960).
66. MODEL Bus. Conp. ACT ANN. §12 4 (1960).
67. S. C. CODE §12-13.5 (Supp. 1962).
68. S. C. CODE §12-58 (152).
69. S. C. CODX §12-19.4 (Supp. 1962).
11
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When an agent becomes incapacitated through death, res-
ignation, or other reason, the corporation must promptly ap-
point another agent and file a written appointment in the
office of the Secretary of State.70 There will probably be
no impairment of the corporation contract rights or obliga-
tions by its failure to appoint a new agent when necessary.
In an early Kentucky case71 where the statute made it un-
lawful for a corporation to carry on business unless there
was on file the name of a registered agent, the court held a
contract valid even though it was made subsequent to the
death of the registered agent. The court said:
"the avowed purpose of the agency being to furnish a
person upon whom process may be served, the operation
of the statute will not be extended beyond what is rea-
sonably necessary to accomplish its purpose."
Such a view seems to be a rational approach and could well
be followed in South Carolina. The 1962 Act provides that
those corporations which fail to file a notice of change of
office or agent within a specified period may be dissolved
by forfeiture
1 2
ANNUAL REPORT
The filing of an annual report by corporations is a require-
ment in every jurisdiction of the United States. There is a
variance among the states as to requirements for domestic
and foreigh corporations and as to whether the filing is under
the corporate tax, or anti-trust laws.73 South Carolina com-
bines its, requirements for domestic and foreign corporations
in one section of the 1962 Act and specifically makes the filing
of the report with the Secretary of State complementary to
reports required to be filed with the tax commission.74 Under
the 1962 Act, one copy of a report containing specified in-
formation is to be submitted to the Secretary of State and
another is to be directed to the South Carolina Tax Commis-
sion together with such other information as that commis-
sion may require.7 5
70. S. C. CODE §12-13.5 (Supp. 1962).
71. House v. Bank of Lewisport, 178 Ky. 281, 198 S. W. 760 (1917).
72. S. C. CODE §12-22.11 (Supp. 1962).
73. MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. §§118,11912.02 (1960).
74. The requirement that corporations file a report with the office of
the Secretary of State was repealed in 1953 and there was substituted a
requirement that corporations file an annual report as required by the
South Carolina Tax Commission. 1953 ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 301.
75. S. C. CODE §12-24.1 (Supp. 1962).
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The consequences of a failure to comply with the filing
requirements are serious; pecuniary penalties are provided
for those tardy in filing and those who fail to file will face
involuntary dissolution or, in the case of foreign corporations,
forfeiture of authority to do business within the State.76
EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS
The 1962 Act accomplishes a needed simplification and
clarification of rules of evidence concerning the admission in
evidence of corporate documents. Basically, the act allows
not only those documents certified by the Secretary of State
to be admitted in evidence 77 but also copies of corporate
records certified as true and correct by specified corporate
officers. 78 Perhaps the real significance of these two sections
is that the burden of proof is shifted to the party attempting
to controvert the admitted documents. A brief analysis of
the prior statutory law may make the force of these provi-
sions evident.
Prior to the 1962 Act, the only statutory rule of evidence
dealing with corporations concerned the establishment of the
corporate status of a party to an action. A copy of the charter
of a corporation was required to be filed with the county
clerk and if duly certified was admissible in all courts and
places as evidence of the organization and existence of the
corporation and of matters specified in the certificate of in-
corporation.
7 9
The 1962 Act goes beyond this elementary concept of ad-
missibility. First, certified copies of all documents required
to be filed are admissible in evidence. Second, the Secretary
of State may issue a certificate, admissible in evidence, as
to the existence or non-existence of the facts stated in them.80
Perhaps the broadest addition is the provision for the ad-
mission of copies of specified corporate records if certified
76. In case of a complete filing default, the Secretary of State is re-
quired to proceed as provided by §12-22.11 (Dissolution of Corporation by
Forfeiture) or §12-23.11 (Revocation of Foreign Corporation's Authority
to do Business in this State) as is appropriate. S. C. CoDE §12-24.2 (Supp.
1962).
77. S. C. Cons §12-24.8 (Supp. 1962).
78. S. C. CODE §12-24.9 (Supp. 1962).
79. S. C. CODE §12-60 (1952).
80. S. C. CODe §12-24.8 (Supp. 1962).
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under oath by the president and either the secretary or an
assistant secretary of the corporation. Again, these docu-
ments are admitted as prima facie evidence of the facts stated
in them.8'
DAVID Y. MONTEITH, III
81. S. C. CODX §12-24.9 (Supp. 1962).
1963] 505
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